

Executive Committee
Review of
Military Reserve Program

PURPOSE: To determine, in the absence of formalized contingency or wartime plans, whether the Agency's Military Reserve Program should be retained, and if continued support is recommended, the future direction of the program.

BACKGROUND: The Agency Reserve Units were established in the 1950's based on a belief that military personnel would be required during an emergency or full wartime mobilization. At that time the Agency had large numbers of veterans holding reserve commission, who, if mobilized, would have created havoc for the Agency unless an internal mechanism existed for their active participation in the reserves and use by the Agency in any future mobilization. Against this background the Agency's Reserve Program was established and its objectives defined as follows:

- o To provide opportunities for Agency reservists to assume their responsibilities for maintaining military proficiencies and enable them to secure military advancement in military grades commensurate with their age and experience;
- o To enable Agency reservists, in a manner consistent with Security, to remain eligible for at least the same privileges which accrue to other reservists; and
- o To establish a pool of highly trained personnel to be part of the military service mobilization assignment to CIA.

(NOTE: In the absence of an authorized program of this type, many Agency reservists would have been forced to transfer to outside units in which case they would be a loss to the Agency in the event of mobilization, or alternatively, they would have had to resign their commissions.)

The Joint Military Reserve Training Command (JMRTC) meets the aforementioned objectives through a joint staff which conducts an annual training program, manages a special projects program in support of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, monitors reservists project work for the Air Force and Marines, and with the assistance of the Military Branch in the Office of Personnel, manages a broad, year-round active duty training program for JMRTC members.

STAT The JMRTC has an authorized strength of [] positions allocated by DoD to meet contingency requirements and wartime/emergency plans. Reservists occupying these Agency dedicated positions are assured of being returned to the Agency in the event of mobilization whereas those assigned to outside reserve units are expected to mobilize with their respective units. The present combined on-duty strength of the JMRTC stands at [] personnel from various branches of the Armed Services [] This figure is down considerably from its peak of approximately [] in the late 1960s and can be expected to continue to decline as fewer employees with military experience enter the Agency, more employees (including those assigned to JMRTC) opt to join outside units for pay purposes, and senior members reach retirement eligibility. STAT STAT

STAT As previously mentioned reservists participating in units outside of the Agency's jurisdiction are expected to mobilize with their respective units in the event of a national emergency and thereby be lost to the Agency. However, it should be noted that the military has an excellent record of assigning military personnel to the Agency on a by-name request, and it can be assumed that this would hold true in an emergency situation. At last count there were approximately [] employees participating in outside units in all branches of the Armed Services and at various locations throughout the greater Washington metropolitan area.

COVER STATUS: The safeguarding of an individuals cover while assigned to the JMRTC, or an outside reserve unit, has been a longstanding concern of the Agency and in particular to CCS. Specific problem areas were covered by the Chief, Central Cover Staff in his memo to the Director of Personnel on 3 May 1982 wherein a proposal was made to issue a HN prohibiting membership of covert personnel in CIA dedicated units. There are ☐ reservists in the JMRTC who are under some type of cover arrangements and an additional ☐ employees assigned to outside units who have cover status. This mix of covert and overt personnel in the same military units and the increased computerization of reserve personnel records within the military services has made it increasingly difficult to conceal the identity of our covert employees from those having access to these records. CCS has explored these problems with the various Armed Services and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have expressed a willingness to accommodate us in establishing new reserve units for covert personnel only. However, they point out that this would only be a temporary solution and such units could not exist long without compromise.

VALUE TO THE AGENCY: There are many intangible benefits for both the Agency and DoD derived from the reserve program. It provides a mechanism through which a large segment of the Agency's professional population is able to interface with the active military forces. This association presents an opportunity for the military and the CIA employee to improve their perspective concerning each others problems and increase rapport and cooperation. Another benefit the Agency gains is the related experience of active duty military training received by the reservists. Perhaps the strongest argument in terms of benefits can be made on the point that the Agency has complete operational control over the reservists

assigned to the JMRTC and thereby has the availability of a pool of individuals with expertise in both the Agency and military operations for utilization in the event of any mobilization.

COST TO THE AGENCY: Administration of the Agency's Reserve Program is the responsibility of the Staff and Military Branch within the Office of Personnel.

STAT [] under the supervision of the branch chief is dedicated in full-time support of this activity. During peak workload periods supplementary assistance is provided by [] detailees assigned to the section. The combined cost of supporting this program, to include secretarial assistance, is estimated at approximately []

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EFFECT OF MOBILIZATION: It is assumed that member of the JMRTC would revert to military detail status and remain in their present assignment in the event of a general mobilization. This assumption is predicated on an outdated agreement (Command Relationship Agreement - CRA) drawn up between the Agency and DoD in 1957 and a 1967 Memo of Understanding which reaffirmed the special status of the Agency's military reserve program. However, DoD has repeatedly stated that these documents are no longer valid as written and continues to threaten withdrawal of the Agency's dedicated mobilization positions in the absence of a current wartime role for our reservists. The impact on the Agency and its mission would depend on the role reservists would be expected to fill in a mobilization mode. If they were expected to remain in their current positions and perform essentially the same duties as they are now doing, then the impact would be negligible. However, if they were expected to enhance strategic intelligence forces overseas in theaters of conflict and this required back-filling of their positions within Headquarters, then the Agency may well be confronted with a severe shortage of personnel in key positions.

In the case of those reservists assigned to outside units, the impact of general mobilization could be expected to be more severe. These members are trained and compensated to perform in their military specialties as a unit and would be expected to mobilize as a unit in the event of a contingency or national emergency. In the event of mobilization there exist the possibility that the military would be agreeable to granting waivers on certain individuals but the Agency could certainly expect to lose a number of these employees. Without knowing precisely the numbers involved in outside units and their individual Agency function, it would be difficult to assess the impact on the Agency's mission with any degree of accuracy.

SUMMATION:

The foregoing is a narrative summation of the issues raised by the Executive Director in his memorandum to the Director of Personnel on 16 November 1982 regarding the Agency's Military Reserve Program. Additional statistical data has been developed, where appropriate, to support the various strength figures cited herein and is available at the committee's request. No attempt has been made to draw any conclusions regarding the validity of the Agency's continuing support of this program, or for its disbandment, but merely to present the EXCOM with requested information for use in their deliberation on the future direction of the program. It should be noted that the military departments (Air Force/Army) are knowledgeable of this review and appear prepared to support any recommendation which might be forthcoming from the committee.

The Agency Military Reserve Program Introduction

1. The Agency's Military Reserve Program known as the Joint Military Reserve Training Command (JMRTC) combines the Agency's Army, Air Force and Marine Reserves under a joint command that is subordinate to the Director of Personnel. The Staff and Military Personnel Branch (SMB) of the Staff Personnel Division executes the Director of Personnel's responsibility for the training and administration of Agency military ^{Reserve Program} [redacted] for the Director of Personnel. The JMRTC exercises its responsibilities through a joint staff which conducts an annual training program, manages a special projects program in support of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, monitors reservist project work for the Air Force and Marines, and, with the assistance of the SMB [redacted] manages a broad, year-round active duty training program for JMRTC members.

2. The first Agency-sponsored military reserve unit was an Army unit which was activated in March 1949. [redacted]

[redacted] In 1955, the DCI obtained approval from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) to establish an overall Agency military reserve program that would enable CIA's military reservists to maintain their military proficiency and to earn promotions and retirement points while remaining under the control of the DCI. The DCI's action grew out of the Agency's desire to allow employees to retain a military reserve affiliation without losing control of individual reservists to the military services in wartime. The JMRTC was established as an independent command in mid-1962 to coordinate the training activities of the various service elements. At its peak in the late 1960s, the JMRTC involved some [redacted] Agency reservists. This number has [redacted] declined in recent years as fewer employees with military experience enter the Agency and as more employees with

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obligations
reserve commissions joined outside units

The current

composition of the JMRTC

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JMRTC Mission

3. The JMRTC conducts a broad training program to prepare Agency reservists to serve in a military role at the direction of the DCI during a situation requiring mobilization. To ready Agency reservists for this role, the JMRTC program is designed to:

- a. Enable Agency reservists to maintain their military status and proficiency.
- b. Enable Agency reservists to obtain additional experiences and skills that are likely to be necessary for performing ~~their~~ wartime duties.

4. The JMRTC also pursues objectives to ensure that its members can benefit both the Service and the Agency through carefully selected active duty tours and an inactive duty training program tailored to the unique intelligence skills of its members. ^{etc programs} This enables the JMRTC to:

- a. Provide DoD an opportunity to use Agency expertise to work on specific intelligence problems during the reservists' annual tour.

- b. Provide the reservist an opportunity to enhance his ability to perform his peacetime Agency job by making contacts with intelligence consumers and analysts in other agencies, and by participating in military exercises and training programs that are not otherwise available to him.

Current Program

5. The JMRTC program consists of several parts, some of which are

RESPONSIVE to the needs of

a single service, but most of which are available to all members.

The formal inactive duty training segment is built around some 30 two-hour assemblies in the Agency auditorium conducted on Monday evenings from September through May. Reservists receive no pay for attending these meetings, but do earn points toward retirement after 20 years of service.

This program is planned and administered by the J-5 and J-3 staffs of the unit, with the assistance of SMB, and is coordinated with the Office of

Training. *The special projects segment is conducted* and, like the Auditorium program, is on a points-only basis, *It* and is

administered by the J-2 staff. The annual two-week active duty tours are arranged through SMB, which also provides the administrative support for the career development, performance evaluation, and other recordkeeping functions that are levied on the command by the Army and Air Force Reserve centers.

Special JMRTC training courses that are developed from time to time as alternative opportunities for two-week active duty training tours are the joint product of JMRTC, SMB and the Office of Training and have normally been opened to nonreservists on a space-available basis. *Similarly the auditorium*

meeting are program is opened to all Agency employees. *the*

A fuller description of each type of training is provided below.

1 Inactive Duty Training Program

6. The inactive duty training program is developed around themes that are part of a three-year training cycle. That cycle consists of programs that address changes in the services and commands (missions, equipment, and activities), *the deployment of* trouble spots that could involve US military forces, and *world situation*

National

intelligence issues and requirements. The theme of the 1982-83 program is Threats and Trouble Spots to US National Security Interests. The program is designed to have knowledgeable speakers from outside and inside the Agency--including a number of JMRTC members--address topics appropriate to the audience both as reservists and as Agency employees and to answer questions. A number of the sessions were panel discussions that followed by a lengthy and lively exchange among the speakers and between the speakers and the audience.

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7. This year's program began with an update on the Military Reserve. The next several sessions provided an overview of the threat to the US with follow-on discussions of specific geographic areas of the world. Major themes include Soviet conventional and strategic capabilities, Third World problems including insurgencies in Central America and Africa, and other threats to US security.

ON issues affecting

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programs OF the Army AND Air Force

8. The training program provides Agency reservists an opportunity to break out of their areas of specialization and attain a more general view of the world situation. Often, presentations in the training program have sparked the interest of nonreservists to attend the Monday evening sessions. Attachment A, Training Topic Scope Notes, provides an outline of this year's program.

topics scheduled for the Monday night

each presentation scheduled for

9. The training program also provides the opportunity for reservists to enhance military skills. Each year, the JMRTC sponsors range firing on one or two weekends during the spring. The firings provide reservists with the opportunity to become Agency and military qualified in the use of the 9mm (and familiar with the use of other weapons.) These firings are conducted at a Fort Meade range operated by the Special Operations Group and under the supervision of SOG officers; ammunition used in the firing is provided by SOG. This year, JMRTC sponsored a one-day

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visit to Aberdeen Proving Ground where members learned about new weapons developments, as well as technical intelligence derived from captured bloc equipment.

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10. ~~A program of special projects enables Agency military reservists to support the military in a way that benefits the individual reservist, his parent unit, and the Agency in a tangible fashion.~~ ^{The unit's program of} ~~direct assistance to the services~~ ^{and} ~~well~~ ^{as well} ~~in a tangible fashion.~~ The projects provide the services with a highly skilled manpower pool to fill nontime-sensitive intelligence requirements. The Agency reservists benefit in terms of opportunities for professional development, ^{generating} cooperation among ~~its own~~ ^{Agency and Service} components, and enhanced relations with participating parts of the DoD. This year's projects, summarized in detail in Attachment B, include:

- a. Preparing biographies of selected Soviet General Officers.
- b. Inputting data into an automated file on statements on the knowledgeability of Soviet emigres.
- c. Reinvestigating activity at the Soviet's Shikhany Central Chemical Proving Ground.
- d. Reviewing Soviet radar developments.
- e. Monitoring the Soviet's ability to electronically penetrate computer systems.

Training in Emergency Planning

11. A two-week training course on Emergency Planning in the Federal Government was conducted in 1981 and 1982. This program was developed by the JMRTC in conjunction with SMB and OTE and included ^{input} ~~participation~~ from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Joint Strategic Connectivity Staff, the National Security Council, and DIA, the Air Force, and several Agency components. The first week of training consisted of a series of lectures on government planning for national emergencies. It also included visits to an

emergency relocation center and to the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon.

12. The second week was oriented toward enhancing military skills through range firing, first aid and CPR training, and instructions in techniques of resisting interrogation. Most of the training was provided by SOG and the Office of Medical Services,

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The course outline has been provided to a number of Agency officers who have a full-time responsibility for conducting training on this subject.

Special Air Force Program

13. Some of the Air Force members of JMRTC receive their inactive duty training as part of a special Air Force unit, designated DTS-28. Some Agency reserve slots were transferred by the CIA to the Air Force Intelligence Service in 19 for its use and management with the stipulation that these spaces will be returned within 30 days upon request of the CIA or upon mobilization. DTS provides direct intelligence support to specific Air Force organizations, to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Mapping Agency, the National Defense University, and the Central Intelligence Agency. DTS-28, which has received strong support and praise from its sponsors, meets eight weekends a year on a ^{for} ~~out~~ basis. It is the only element of JMRTC that is paid for inactive duty training. A list of its projects ^{are} ~~include~~ shown at a attachment

Annual Active Duty Training

14. At least once each year, each JMRTC member is required to take a two-week active duty tour. These tours are funded by the reserve components of the military services and arranged by the reservist through SMPB. They allow Agency reservists to participate in a military exercise, attend a military training course or work on a special assignment at a US military facility in the US or overseas.

15. The distribution of 1982 tours is shown below by the level of command and percent of membership participation. The chart is based on a sampling of data available in the SMB and through a ~~recent~~ ^{recent} survey of JMRTC reservists.

National Level (DIA, NSA, JCS, ACDA) 32%

Training Courses 23%

(This category includes the active duty segment
of required branch or overall command courses
and the special JMRTC two-week training program)

CONUS Major Command/Joint Command/etc.

(SAC, FTD, JSOC, REDCOM) 12%

Overseas Units 12%

Headquarters Level (Hq USAF, DA, USMC) 10%

CONUS Units 7%

Overseas Major Command/Joint Command/etc.

(EUCOM, SOUTHCOM) 6%

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18. Appendix D provides the complete responses of reservists to the survey questions. It discloses many of the benefits of the reserve program to Agency, the DoD, and the individual reservist in terms of growth through experience, preparation of useful products for the military, and the building of bridges between the Agency and the military. There were some negative comments concerning usefulness of some active duty tours, but these were few in numbers. Those negative comments are also included in Appendix ^{the} ~~the~~

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EFFECT

[REDACTED] OF MOBILIZATION:

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It is not certain what effect mobilization would have on the current members of the JMRTC. Under the Command Relationship Agreement of 1957 and the Memorandum of Understanding of 1967 which reaffirmed the special status of the Agency military reserve program, it seems likely that the members of JMRTC would be activated in place [REDACTED] ^{Reserve} the individuals would continue to perform their regular Agency assignments, but as active duty military officers, becoming, in effect, military detailees under the operational control of the DCI. At least for the members of the Army portion of JMRTC, i.e., the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] this arrangement would be consistent with their present status as mobilization designees having no other unit affiliation or separate mobilization billet. There is, of course, a broad range of scenarios under which mobilization could occur and the impact on JMRTC members and the Agency of each situation is likely to range accordingly.

Three types of conflict that cover the spectrum and are frequently used in illustrative analysis are:

- (1) limited war or demonstration of force
- (2) general conventional war
- (3) general nuclear war.

In the case of a limited conflict or other special action where a limited number of US forces are committed, e.g. the current peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, it is likely that Defense would rely largely on forces in being and

would not make any call upon individual mobilization designees. The increased national intelligence support required by the forces involved in the military action could probably be provided by the Agency without the requirement for making any special organizational adjustments such as calling for direct support from the JMRTC.

LEGIB A ^{large scale} [] conventional war, however, would almost certainly involve a general mobilization that would recall to active duty not only all active reservists, including the members of JMRTC, but many inactive reservists as well. In these circumstances, the military would also require greatly increased national intelligence support, and the Agency would probably be called upon to devise extraordinary mechanisms to provide such assistance. While the current structure of the JMRTC is not designed to meet this purpose, the proposed formation of Regional Coordination Groups would be ideally suited for such a task, even under the current JMRTC structure, and the active reserve status of JMRTC members would make them natural candidates for any ad hoc organization formed to provide enhanced strategic intelligence to combat forces in any theater of conflict.

In the event of a general nuclear war, the ^{use} [] of individual ILLEGIB mobilization designees would be determined by the way in which the crisis evolved:

-- If the conflict became a nuclear war through a limited exchange of nuclear weapons and a gradual escalation over a period of weeks or even months, it is quite likely that the JMRTC role would be similar to one it would have in a general conventional war;

-- In the case of an all-out nuclear exchange, it seems more

JMRTC could assume any special wartime mission or individual mobilization designees could be effectively employed through a call-up. Even in this circumstance, however, JMRTC members could continue to provide direct intelligence support to the active fighting forces through performance of their Agency assignments. They would have one important qualification shared by few other Agency employees, ^{by} name an up-to-date knowledge of military doctrine, organization, and equipment.

✓ Thus under the present organizational structure of the Agency reserve unit, it seems probable that mobilization would have virtually no effect on JMRTC members other than to change their civilian status to military status and their present GS or SIS grade to their current military rank. The DCI would, of course, retain control over all members of the JMRTC and it would be his decision as to whether or not to change the assignment of individual JMRTC officers in order to take full advantage of their military skills and experience. It seems likely that for a number of JMRTC members, there would be some modification of duties to facilitate the coordination of activities between CIA and the military services.

It should be noted, moreover, that both the Army and the Air Force have recently asked the respective components of the JMRTC to identify the missions of their units in wartime. In addition, the Director of Personnel requested that ExCom review the wartime rationale and current value of the JMRTC. It is in response to these requests that the concept of Regional Coordination Groups was developed by the Chairman of the Interdirectorate Planning Group. The rationale and proposed implementation of that concept are described in a separate section.

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In the case of Agency employees who are members of external reserve units, the impact of general mobilization on the Agency could be more severe. Participation in [] reserve units [] that train as units and provide compensation to members for training [] normally require that a participant's employer sign a statement promising the availability of the reservist in time of war. []

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In the event of mobilization,

the Agency normally would be expected to honor its commitment to release these reservists for military duty when these units are activated. The ^{Agency} [] could intercede with DoD and ask for a waiver of such agreements to avoid loss of an individual or group of employees in time of war. Although the military services might grant a waiver in some instances, there is no guarantee that it would do so for all such Agency reservists. It seems prudent for the Agency to assume that it would lose some number of its employees who are members of external units in time of general war. The number of employees affected and the impact on Agency capabilities cannot be determined with any degree of precision at this time. []

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From DoD's perspective, the Agency would not have acted in good faith in allowing reservists to participate in Category I units and then withdrawing them (or attempting to withdraw them) when a crisis occurred. []

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17 January 1983

A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

A new mission and organizational concept for the JMRTC was recently adopted by the Agency's Interdirectorate Planning Group and is proposed as the basis for reorienting the Reserve program. The concept was devised [redacted]

[redacted] and was used during the summer of 1982 to provide justification to the Air Force for the continuation of the Agency's Air Force Reserves. The proposal was accepted by the Air Force and has been used to reorganize the Air Force element of the JMRTC. The Army element of the JMRTC has not yet implemented or sought Army approval for a similar reorganization pending the review of the Reserve program by the Executive Committee.

The new mission and organizational structure are based on the assumption that the CIA's requirement to provide intelligence and operational support to US military commands would increase substantially in wartime. Under this concept, the Agency Reserve program would provide the manpower trained in both Agency and military organization, skills, and programs, which the DCI could draw upon to meet this expanded support requirement in time of conflict. To prepare for this ~~note~~ ^{role}, the Agency Reserve program would be organized into liaison elements that could be deployed and attached to the headquarters of major military commands in wartime. This arrangement would be consistent with the provision of paragraph 7 of the 1967 Memorandum of Understanding between CIA and DoD for mutual support in contingencies short of general war (JCS SM 1567, January 1967). This agreement provides that prior to or during a contingency requiring the coordinated efforts of CIA and DoD, a unified command or subordinate military command may request a liaison element from

CIA.

The new concept would provide for ☐ CIA liaison elements, each made up of ☐ Agency reservists. The total number of positions required to implement this structure--☐--is equal to the numbers of reserve billets currently allotted by DoD to the Agency Reserve program. As originally conceived, the ☐ elements would be divided between the Air Force and Army elements of the JMRTC, each of which would staff ☐. The liaison elements would be officially known as Regional Coordination Groups and, when deployed, would operate under the control of a DDO area division chief.

Within the Regional Coordination Groups, there would be four operational elements: a plans division, an intelligence division, a collection division, and a support division. The actual make-up of the Groups when deployed would depend on the needs of the command to which it is attached and the type of environment in which it would operate. The organization shown at Attachment E illustrates the type of structure the JMRTC would use in peacetime for training and administrative purposes. *The role of each operational element are as follows:*

The Plans Division, composed of DDO officers, would provide local coordination between the military and CIA elements for covert action operations and unconventional warfare activities. The Intelligence Division would provide the supported command with analytical support and area expertise; augmenting the command's own intelligence analysis capability. The Collection Division would be responsible for brokering information and intelligence exchanges between CIA elements and the military command, as well as assisting the command in formulating and expediting the processing of HUMINT collection requirements. The Support Division, composed of DDA personnel, would be charged with supplying administrative and logistics support to the members of RCGs and assisting the military command in instances where Agency-unique logistical

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support might be required.

The composition of each RCG would have to be tailored to the particular requirements of the command to which they would be attached and the situation at the time of deployment. The ratio between operations officers, analysts, and paramilitary specialists would be dictated by operational considerations. In some commands the RCGs would consist primarily of operations officers, while in others officers with analytic backgrounds would be the dominant group. In some ^{instances} ~~cases~~ the groups might have to be augmented by Reservists from other RCGs or by non-Reservists in order to meet a requirement of a specific command; in others, it is likely that not all the Reservists allotted to an RCG would be deployed to a command because it might require that level of support or any support at all.

For planning and training purposes, a Regional Coordination Group would be organized for deployment with each of the five existing unified commands: EUCOM, PACOM⁶, SOUTHCOM, MIDEASTCOM, and REDCOM. An additional five groups would be established to support joint task forces or other commands that DoD might establish after the outbreak of major hostilities. These additional groups would be manned at full or reduced strength depending on the availability of qualified JMRTC personnel. Not all of the groups would be deployed to newly created commands or a joint task force; that decision would be made by the DCI when ^{and} if the DoD requested Agency augmentation by a Regional Coordination Group. In those instances where RCGs are not committed, their personnel would be used to flesh out other RCGs or held in reserve for contingency situations. Individual JMRTC members would continue to function in their regular Agency assignments until the need for the deployment with an RCG was identified.

Revised

THE TRAINING PROGRAM UNDER THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

1. The unit training program would be focused on the development and enhancement of required individual skills, occupational specialties (SSIs, formerly known as MOS and AFSCS), and geographic area expertise as well as on developing and enhancing the capability of the Regional Coordination Groups to perform their wartime missions. The training program would be cyclical, following a repetitive schedule of activities and themes (see Attachment F). These would include general military- and service-related issues; intelligence collection, analysis, and support issues; worldwide and regional affairs; and specialized issues unique to the CIA and its wartime missions and functions.

Types of Training

2. The annual program would involve four levels of training: general unit training program; Regional Coordination Group programs; individual training; and annual active duty training.

General Unit Training Program: the annual unit training program would focus on a specific theme according to a triennial cycle. All members of the unit would attend periodic unit training meetings in lieu of their weekly Regional Coordination Group (RCG) meetings. These unit meetings would feature in-house and outside speakers, field trips, or other special activities related to that year's training theme. The initial few unit meetings each year would be devoted to an update of DoD-wide and service-related military program and management issues, including a presentation by the Director of Reserve Affairs, OSD. General unit meetings would be held at least once a month at CIA Headquarters.

RCG Training. On weeks that general units meetings are not held, each RCG would meet separately (as a Group or by division/element) in accordance with a Group training program. Training would consist of regionally-oriented projects, speakers or activities that would focus on developing and enhancing the Group's ability to perform its wartime mission. If desired by the supported military command, the Group could engage in a special research project during the year and use its weekly meeting for planning. Actual project work would normally be accomplished outside of weekly meetings. Periodically the RCG's divisions would meet separately for specialized training sessions related to their unique functions (e.g., collection/UCW).

Individual Training. Individual training--either as ^{an} adjunct to or in conjunction with annual active duty training--would focus on the development and enhancement of individual military skills, completion of military occupational specialty training requirements, basic and advanced branch courses, and advanced schooling (e.g., Command and General Staff). This training normally would involve correspondence courses or special resident courses at military schools and training facilities. The individual reservist would be required to attain an SSI rating--on his own time--appropriate to his assignment within the RCG.

Active Duty Training. Each unit reservist would complete an annual 12-day or longer tour of active duty for training (ACDUTRA).

Normally, these tours would enhance expertise required for the reservist's RCG assignment; provide regional orientation or refresher training; involve on-the-job training with the supported command; or involve attendance at a military school to meet promotion

requirements. At least once every 3-4 years, each RCG would undergo ACDUTRA as a group at a secure facility [] for a program developed by the RCG and related to its wartime missions.

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Alternatively, the RCG's divisions/elements could train together on a team basis in CONUS or overseas with the supported command.

Unresolved Issues

3. Most problems related to training that can be anticipated would evolve from unique cover requirements to protect covert CIA employees.

General Training. If cover requirements dictated strict separation (organizationally and physically) of overt and covert CIA employees, separate unit training programs would be required for each element. Although both elements would train according to the same annual program and cycle, duplicate programs would be required, increasing the burden on speakers, complicating the reservation of training facilities, and dictating more complex administrative arrangements.

RCG Training. Unique cover requirements would have a fundamental effect on the ability of the RCG to train as a group. Covert and overt members could be divided into two training elements along group division lines, but group effectiveness would be severely degraded if the RCG could not meet periodically as a unit. Unique arrangements would be required for individual and team active duty training with the supported command. More frequent team training programs at a secure site [] might be required to compensate for the lack of regular group activity.

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Attachment F

Representative Triennial Unit Training Program

<u>Year</u>	<u>Theme</u>	<u>Representative Sessions*</u>
1	US Military Programs and Issues	Unconventional warfare Service procurement programs Rapid Deployment Force US Military command structure Emergency planning/management Army/USAF/Navy/Marines updates
2	Worldwide Intelligence Issues	The Worldwide Threat Arms Control--Arms Transfer Nuclear Proliferation East-West Trade International Economics Narcotics Terrorism
3	Regional Challenges to US Security	Prepared/sponsored by RCGs Europe Middle East/SW Asia Africa Far East/SE Asia Latin America

* The initial 1-2 sessions would be devoted to an update on military service and regional program issues and highlights.

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